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LEARNING FROM FAILURE IN SE: A PANEL DISCUSSION
ABSTRACT
This paper summarizes the discussion of the Learning from Failure in Systems Engineering panel that was 
held in Huntsville, AL on November 8, 2010. The panel objective was to discuss how systems engineers 
respond to and learn from failure and identify future directions important to the community. The panel 
consisted of four representatives with experience in government, industry, and academia: (1) Ronald 
Kadish from Booz Allen Hamilton and former director of the Missile Defense Agency, (2) Gary Payton, 
retired Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for Space Programs, (3) John Thomas from Booz Allen 
Hamilton and President-elect of INCOSE, and (4) Michael Griffin from the University of Alabama, Huntsville 
and former NASA Administrator. Each panelist was asked to (i) provide an opening statement and 
elaborate on their experience with failure, (ii) describe when failure is appropriate, (iii) describe how we 
learn and react to failure, and (iv) identify and discuss techniques to improve how systems engineers react 
to failure. Several common themes arose from the discussion including: failure is an option, the importance 
of failure to allow reassessment, and more process is not the solution. Each of these is discussed in turn 
along with future directions identified for reacting to and learning from failure. 
Key words: failure;  product success; risk; lessons from failure; process
1. INTRODUCTION
The security and many aspects of a nation’s economic prow-
ess depends heavily on how well its aerospace, defense, and
energy systems perform. Understandably, systems engineers
spend a great deal of energy and resources avoiding the failure
of these critical capabilities: Process and controls are insti-
tuted or improved; accountability reviews and milestones are
defined; and historical experience is incorporated into organ-
*Author to whom all correspondence should be addressed (e-mail:
slegers@mae.uah.edu; slegers@eng.uah.edu; kadish_ronald@bah.com;
gary.payton@sci-aero.com; thomas_john@bah.com; mdg0007@uah.edu;
daniel.l.dumbacher@nasa.gov).
izational culture and training [Hanawant and Rouse, 2010;
Nagano, 2008]. Unintended consequences can arise, however,
from the practice of avoiding and reacting to failure. Organ-
izational culture can become risk-averse, thereby discourag-
ing innovation and forgoing its rewards. An abundance of
engineering process and controls can mask essential issues
that affect a system’s ability to meet strategic objectives. The
pace of system design and development slows and costs rise
with the encumbrance of reviews designed to eliminate, not
just identify, and accept levels of risk. Historically, we have
done a laudable job addressing the symptoms of a failure and
implementing changes to eliminate or minimize reoccurrence
[Sisson, 2005; Hessami, 1999]. However, we have not always
done as thorough a job diagnosing the problem, creating the
appropriate feedback loops to educate practitioners on the
lessons, or creating the structural change required for a com-
prehensive and far-reaching solution.
It is typically recognized that failure is a common occur-
rence and that future success is often a consequence of our
reaction to failure [Louthan, 2010]. Hazard analysis which
relies on engineering expertise and judgment to identify,
classify, and manage risk has continued to have an important
role in foreseeing and preventing critical system failure
[McKelvey, 1988; Collins, 2010]. Petroski [1985, 1994] has
offered many thoughts on failure’s role in engineering; in-
cluding its value for design revision and failure as a source of
engineering judgment. However, as the complexity of sys-
tems continues to increase, the difficulty of understanding
systems and their failure also grows due to interactions and
potentially unforeseen failures [Wears, Cook, and Perry,
2006]. Some have even acknowledged that it may not be
possible for these complex systems to be designed with
acceptable confidence according to our current expectations,
and failure may be inevitable [Calvano and John, 2004]. The
continued failure of important complex systems has lead to
some asking: how did the system fail despite everything
thought to be necessary in the way of process being done
[Griffin, 2010]?
To gain a better understanding of failure’s role in systems
engineering and appropriate reactions to failure, a panel dis-
cussion on Learning from Failure in Systems Engineering was
held in Huntsville, AL on November 8, 2010. The objective
of the panel was to discuss how systems engineers respond to
and learn from failure and identify future directions important
to the community. The discussion was moderated by Dan
Dumbacher, Engineering Director of the NASA Marshall
Space Flight Center, and the panel consisted of: (1) Ronald
Kadish from Booz Allen Hamilton and former director of the
Missile Defense Agency, (2) Gary Payton, retired Deputy
Under Secretary of the Air Force for Space Programs, (3) John
Thomas from Booz Allen Hamilton and President-elect of
INCOSE, and (4) Michael Griffin from the University of
Alabama, Hunstville and former NASA Administrator. The
discussion was structured around four questions with panel-
ists asked to (i) provide an opening statement and elaborate
on their experience with failure, (ii) describe when failure is
appropriate, (iii) describe how we learn and react to failure,
and (iv) identify and discuss techniques to improve how
systems engineers react to failure.
The intention of this paper is to serve as a catalyst among
the systems engineering community for broadening the dis-
cussion of how to learn from failure and its role. It is the
authors’ and panelists’ hope that the subsequent summary will
promote modifications and debate of the panelists’ discussion
and advance the state-of-practice in systems engineering. The
following sections summarize the discussion that occurred
during the panel. Section 2 addresses discussion point (i) and
contains a brief overview of three specific examples of failure
provided by the panel. Several common themes arose from
the panel’s examples and discussion of points (ii) and (iii)
such as: Failure is an option, the importance of failure to allow
reassessment, and more process is not the solution. Each of
these themes is discussed individually in Sections 3, 4, and 5,
respectively. Finally, the paper ends with a summary of the
panel’s closing remarks, suggestions for reacting to and learn-
ing from failure, and their implications to needs in changing
the way we approach workforce development in systems
engineering.
2. PANELIST EXAMPLES OF FAILURE
The panel provided a variety of examples where they experi-
enced system failures at different stages and with varying
levels of final success. These examples ranged from the X-33
reusable launch vehicle and Hubble Space Telescope to the
Delta 180 powered space interceptor. A brief overview of each
example follows.
2.1. X-33 Reusable Launch Vehicle
When it comes to systems engineering on a vehicle, Payton
pointed to the X-33. The X-33 was a reusable launch vehicle
program started in 1996 and was part of the broader Reusable
Launch Vehicle technology demonstration program which
also included the DC-XA, X-34, and X-37. The technical
objectives of the X-33 program were to develop and demon-
strate the use of lightweight composite materials for internal
liquid hydrogen fuel tanks, linear aerospike rocket engines, a
durable thermal protection system, and aircraftlike operations
[US GAO, 1999]. Payton emphasized, as part of the program
end goal, the teams intentionally reached for new technology
on every subsystem of the X-33. Because it had been so many
years since America had invested a significant amount in new
launch vehicle technology, that type of catch-up game had to
be endorsed, and it was fully suspected that there would be
failures in ground tests. One of the many challenges was in
the linear aerospike rocket engine, which had to use differen-
tial throttling for ascent attitude control. Due to its high risk,
teams had alternative designs in their hip pocket in case that
engine faced development problems. However, as in all pro-
grams, not enough resources, money, and facilities were avail-
able to have equivalent alternatives on every single subsystem
of the X-33. Eventually one of the other subsystems experi-
enced a technical failure in test. As Payton explained, based
on the unprecedented nature of the program and its end goal,
and under the conventional rhetoric that if you weren’t occa-
sionally failing, you weren’t reaching far enough, that should
have been embraced. The teams reached far, they struggled,
and they learned what didn’t work. However, due to a lack of
persistence and potentially a lack of constant vision at the
agency level the program was canceled in 2001.
2.2. Hubble Space Telescope
One example provided by Griffin was his work on the Hubble
Space Telescope, his first job as a systems engineer while at
the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory.
Griffin, along with a significant team of people, was asked to
design and develop a backup system for the primary fine
guidance sensor that would work on different principles [Grif-
fin, Strikwerda, and Grant, 1984]. As part of the job, the team
was asked to look across the Hubble of that day, not the
Hubble that was eventually launched in 1990, and render a
separate and impartial assessment of systems engineering on
the telescope.
As chief engineer for that team, Griffin noted it was eye
opening as problems were identified. It turned out that that
the team was asked to assess the fine guidance system because
the original design was based on a factor of 4 error in the
number of photons that could be expected to be gathered in a
given sample period. The result would be large errors in the
visual magnitude of the stars they were trying to observe. In
addition, it was found that people who were working the
design of the solar arrays were not coordinating with people
who worked the design of the control system. Therefore, as
the solar arrays would swing in and out of the sunlight, they
would irrevocably excite satellite motion in return and there
was no image motion compensation or effective correction
inside the control loop. Another problem was that the elec-
tronics were more appropriate to launch vehicle heritage than
long-term satellites, with Hubble reaching its lifetime ex-
pected radiation dose in only a few months. Finally the team,
along with many others, identified that there was no end-to-
end test of the telescope.
Despite these errors, what stood out to Griffin was that
each contractor could prove that they fully met the require-
ments of their side of the interface control document. Yet it
was completely obvious, even to Griffin as a young systems
engineer, that the device when fielded would not work. This
proved to be true for the reasons described, as well as a variety
of others. Certainly there were failures of system engineering
in the effort of which the highly publicized flawed mirror was
front and center. However, while being properly called a
failure in systems engineering for several years, after the first
servicing mission in 1993 the telescope became fully func-
tional. The current result, due in large part to the persistence
and commitment of the international scientific community, is
that the Hubble Space Telescope has become a world icon.
2.3. Delta 180 Powered Space Interceptor
A second example provided by Griffin was his work as chief
engineer on the first powered space interceptor, Delta 180
[Griffin and Rendine, 1988]. The Delta 180 was a success,
and it performed a hit-to-kill intercept. While a success, one
of the things that was not discovered until sometime afterward
was that the endgame control simulations had not taken into
account the hysteresis involved due to a small amount of
stiction, a friction force that had to be initially overcome in
the radar homing device. Overlooking the effect caused the
control loop to lag just slightly from what was expected from
the models and, as a result, produced a porpoising in the
trajectory of just a few feet. As Griffin noted, fortunately,
interceptor technology at the time was not good; therefore, the
interceptor was very big. The porpoising error luckily was not
large enough that it took it outside the diameter of the objects
in question, and the system managed to score a hit-to-kill with
only a glancing blow. If interceptor technology had been more
advanced at the time, the interceptor most likely would have
missed. However, because of its success a considerable time
elapsed before anyone went back to look and found the ways
in which the team had gotten lucky.
Overlooking the stiction in this case was not due to lack of
attention to the endgame homing guidance problem. Three
separate teams were simulating the homing guidance. The
teams were allowed to talk to each other only under specific
circumstances to ensure they were not corrupting each other
with groupthink. Three independent simulations were de-
sired, followed by technical interchange meetings. Launch
occurred only when the collective circular error probables
were within 0.5 m. Despite the process, nobody thought about
the difference in the way the stiction was going to react in
vacuum versus high altitude flight. The team was a bit lucky;
in fact, three separate teams, as well as the systems engineer,
missed something. An interesting lesson that could and should
have been learned much earlier wasn’t learned because of
success.
3. FAILURE IS AN OPTION
Kadish started by declaring his shock at the panel title. He was
shocked because, as he explained, most of the time people
don’t talk about failure; they talk about how to avoid failure.
Society has been developing a hubris that we know how to do
everything and that, every time we make a mistake, it is
something we should have known better about or it was
because of a poor management situation. There is a perception
in society that demands success the first time and every time.
In contrast to perception, it is not possible to always avoid
failure; therefore, it is vital to think and talk about what it
means to learn from failure.
The hubris Kadish described is also apparent from the
ubiquitous use of the phrase “failure is not an option” made
famous by the 1995 film Apollo 13. Gene Kranz, Flight
Director during the Apollo 13 space mission, later wrote a
book by the same name because he felt it reflected the attitude
of Mission Control [Cass, 2005]. Subsequently “failure is not
an option” has been used by many as a rallying cry, often
naively attempting to declare that if they decide to take failure
away as an option, they must necessarily succeed. A source
of such confusion may be ambiguity in the definition of
failure. Kadish pointed out that he has a problem with the
definition of “failure” in systems engineering. According to
Kadish, what failure means is you don’t accomplish what you
set out to as an end item, what we regard as being necessary
in the end. From his experience, failure is an option at every
step except the final goal. Thomas concurred with the assess-
ment and embraced the idea that failure is critical in the
intermediate steps leading to the end objective. Returning to
the X-33 example, because teams reached for new technology
on every subsystem, failure at the intermediate steps was fully
suspected. As Payton emphasized, those intermediate failures
should have been embraced because of its value in pushing
new technology.
“Failure is not an option,” used by Kranz in his book to
describe Mission Control’s attitude, is more consistent with
the panel’s definition of failure, than how it is often used.
Clearly, failure was an option as demonstrated by the oxygen
tank explosion which crippled the command module and
initiated the tense events to follow. In addition, further inter-
mediate failures were possible as the crew, flight controllers,
and support personnel engineered a safe return. Indeed as the
panel stated, failure is an option at every step except the final
goal, which in the case of Apollo 13 was a safe return of the
crew.
Evaluation of the three examples provided by the panel
also demonstrates that failure is an option. In each example,
failures occurred or easily could have occurred at intermediate
steps. In X-33, failure occurred on subsystems that, due to
finite resources, did not have an alternative technical strategy.
Multiple failures occurred on the Hubble Space Telescope,
some identified prior to launch, others after. Failure was also
an option, though narrowly avoided on the Delta 180 because,
as Griffin put it, they were a bit lucky.
Abundant failures occurred at intermediate steps in both
X-33 and Hubble. Despite failure being present, only X-33
resulted in failure of its end goal. The lessons to be learned
lie in how failures were treated differently in the two cases.
Griffin explained that in Hubble there certainly were failures
of system engineering. In the end, who knows about these
failures other than those who were intimately involved with
the Hubble? In the end it has become an icon, not only an
American icon but a world icon. Its pictures adorn art muse-
ums as well as computer screens of astronomers. What ac-
counted for that was persistence, the willingness to learn from
failure, to not accept final failure, to apply the necessary
corrections in the wake of intermediate failures on the way to
success, and in the end, to do what was necessary to achieve
success. If someone tells you today that the Hubble overran
by a factor of 3 or more, is there anybody who actually cares?
Probably not, because of what it has done and what it has
become. Those are some of the lessons to learn from what
could have, for several years, only properly been called a
failure of system engineering. That is not what we call it today.
In contrast to the persistence of Hubble stands X-33. As
Payton described, initial commitments existed. The rhetoric
of the day was if you weren’t having the occasional failure,
you weren’t pushing hard enough; you weren’t reaching far
enough. That is great rhetoric, but at the first instance of
failure, all that rhetoric often evaporates. You must have
persistence in your mission; a dedication to your end goal at
the agency level. Simple rhetoric is not adequate to deliver the
success that is needed. The need for persistence in the face of
failure has another dimension which was identified by
Kadish. To be persistent, you need to set expectations right.
There are things other than just the technical problem that
applies. You not only learn technical lessons from failure, you
learn that getting the needed resources and setting the political
tempo as best you can is also important.
4. FAILURE PROVIDES THE CHANCE TO
REASSESS
The panel embraced the notion that failure is an option and
furthermore, for a system, it should be expected that failure
at an intermediate stage will occur. Since we cannot abso-
lutely avoid failure, what should its role be, and what does it
mean to learn from failure? Thomas proposed that failure is
the thing that provides the chance to reassess, to reassess how
well we are listening to the team, to reassess how accurate and
at what level of voracity are the assumptions that we are
making, to reassess the viewpoint of our perspective of the
problem that we have defined.
The insight that failure’s value may be the role it plays for
reassessment was extended beyond engineering by Griffin.
He identified Bobby Jones as a golfer he greatly admired and
noted Jones once said “I never learned anything from a match
I won.” Griffin connected this back to his experience on Delta
180 in Section 2.3, where because they were successful, they
were denied the opportunity to learn from reassessment until
much later. When talking about successful tests, we tend not
to study them if the test went as expected. Generally there is
buried in any success many instances of, “Wow, we dodged a
bullet on that and we just didn’t know it.” As with many series
of tests, more can be learned from a single failure than can be
learned from all the successes. As Kadish clarified, this is
often the case because there is hubris on our part and we don’t
look as critically at successes as we should when compared
to the case when failure forces us to reassess. These thoughts
are also reinforced by Petroski’s insight that failure has the
ability to nurture humility and caution [Petroski, 2007].
Reassessment as the opportunity birthed from failure can
be related to the identity of a systems engineer. Thomas put
forward this hypothesis: Can system failures be attributed to
the system engineer who has lost their identity as they have
that chance to reassess? Since failure is an option at interme-
diate steps, the systems engineer has a responsibility to reas-
sess, a responsibility to learn, and a responsibility to make
decisions in the face of failure. When systems fail in their end
goal, is it because of a failure at an intermediate stage or
failure of the system engineer to seize the chance to reassess
when the intermediate failure occurs?
5. MORE PROCESS IS NOT THE SOLUTION
5.1. What Process Can’t Do and Why It Is Not a
Solution
One observation of the panel was that failures of system
engineering process in the past typically resulted in the addi-
tion of more process. Aversion to all failure has resulted in
substitution of abundant processes, analysis, and band aids to
prevent us from failing at every step along the way. Systems
engineers have often substituted that for the real creative
process, leadership, and discipline in accomplishing what was
set out to do. The result is an encumbrance of rules, regula-
tions, policies, and laws for a system which should be much
more fluid. Griffin pointed out that if you didn’t have process
and someone said “you had a failure of process,” then you
probably should attend to that. But after 50 years of process,
and with the layers and layers of what can only be described
as bureaucratic process, he has become jaded as to the mar-
ginal value of more process. If systems engineers are to
achieve success through failure, the community must be pre-
pared to do something different. Process is not an answer to
failure. It might be a part of the answer, but is not the answer
to a technical setback. As leaders there are other options.
To be clear, the panel is not suggesting that the methods,
processes, and tools which characterize systems engineering
today are entirely defective but, rather, the misuse of process
in replacement of thinking and self-accountability is amiss.
Similarly, the panel is not suggesting that process is the source
of the problem, but rather misuse of process to address a
failure that process cannot solve is the problem. An example
of the misuse of process is the addition of an extra layer of
review in response to failure, when the real problem was not
the existing process, but rather that the original reviews were
incompetent. Processes can be wrong; they can have errors or
failures themselves. As highlighted in the previous example,
many times the best starting point is correction of existing
errors, not defining new processes.
In order to identify when process is an inappropriate reac-
tion to failure the panel identified five tasks that simply adding
more process can’t do. Kadish identified the first two from his
experiences where people have proven without a shadow of a
doubt that they followed every step of the process yet still
failed. In these situations one needs to ask, “Would more
process help?” The reason for failure is often not the process,
but that the team didn’t understand what they were doing in
the first place; and the need is to find the right type of
leadership with an understanding of how the system is sup-
posed to work. In such a situation more process is not a
solution because (i) process can’t replace leadership or under-
standing and (ii) good process well followed does not prevent
failure. Both are demonstrated by the importance of human
factors in failure with some case studies provided by McEvily
[2004].
Griffin, an avid pilot, used his preflight checklist to illus-
trate other items process can’t do. His checklist is unique to
his airplane and that checklist is “process,” nothing but proc-
ess. However, passing the checklist does not do anything to
teach you how to fly. As with flying, and similarly in engi-
neering, there is more than one skill involved. Engineers need
to have process standards by which we execute our day-to-day
chores; it saves us from making an error of omission, just as
having a checklist saves a pilot from taking off with the flaps
down. However, just as with the pilot’s checklist, process has
limits to what it can do: (iii) Process does not make a bad
design better, (iv) process does not help distinguish a good
design from a bad design, and (v) process doesn’t tell you
what to do if you have identified a bad design. Process does
not do anything at all with regard to very significant pieces of
the overall engineering profession. If we ever allow ourselves,
as individuals or as organizations, to believe that those other
pieces of the engineering development profession are not
equally important, then we will fail; we will just fail for
another reason. In engineering, like flying, you need to follow
the checklist, but you also need to know how to engineer.
5.2. Why We Fall Back on Process
Despite the previously mentioned limitations of process to
provide solutions to failure, leadership, managers, and engi-
neers typically respond by the addition of more process. An
important step in learning from failure and determining what
needs to been done differently is understanding why process
is the natural human reaction of the leadership.
In a position where you suffer the scars of a major systems
failure, where programs can get cancelled or other deleterious
events happen, you have to struggle with the idea of account-
ability and the issue of leadership. What do you do when you
have a large organization that has focused on a program and
something goes wrong: You have failure; you have a setback?
Or you have a few setbacks that are not expected. What does
the leadership do to react to that? Kadish submitted that,
having been in that situation, you wring your hands and say
“If I put more process in, I can fix this.” Absent another
suggestion, that tends to be what happens. Human nature feels
that if they levy more process in the wake of any problem,
they can point to that as something they did. Griffin points out
that other options exist. However, one is less able to demon-
strate as a manager that you have done something if you
replace personnel at the top who didn’t have a grasp of the
system with another person whom you feel has a better grasp.
When you have to defend that decision in public or in the
bureaucracy people ask, “Can you prove it?” Of course you
can’t “prove it,” and that makes the latter option uncomfort-
able, even though it may be more likely to be a productive
solution than simply more process.
Thomas put an edge on the discussion by framing it another
way. When you are dealing with a bureaucracy, process is to
a bureaucracy as heroin is to an addict; it is the thing that
makes you feel safe, and it is the thing that allows you to
assume something else is taking care of the problem. More
process offers the illusion of control. It is in fact just an
illusion, but it does exist as an illusion. It is a case where to
recognize anarchy is ineffective; one then concludes a situ-
ation under complete control must therefore be the most
effective. As with most things in life, the best result is some-
where in the middle. It was the writer Madeleine L’Engle who
wrote, “When we were children, we used to think that when
we were grown-up we would no longer be vulnerable. But to
grow up is to accept vulnerability....” [L’Engle, 1980, p. 145].
Similarly, for young systems engineers, it is often expected
that wielding process can remove vulnerability to failure. It is
only as they mature that they begin to accept vulnerability to
failure, how to learn from it, and how to harness it to achieve
success through failure.
5.3. Consequences of Excessive Process
While simply adding process is likely not the right answer in
response to any particular failure, indulging people’s addic-
tion to process may seem harmless as long as the additional
process is innocuous. However, if additional layers of unnec-
essary process do indeed have malicious consequences, their
addition simply to satisfy human desires or remove leadership
from the hot seat of public opinion may be severely detrimen-
tal. As the panel continued discussion of the role of process
as a response to failure, two consequences of excessive proc-
ess were identified.
The first consequence was offered by Thomas. He submit-
ted that while process is necessary, human behavior seems to
evolve so that process, when not watched very carefully,
seems to remove self-accountability, self-thinking, and retro-
spection. In all successful projects there is a level of personal
commitment, integrity, and accountability, whether it is
among engineers or technicians. The more process you lay on
top, the more layers of inspectors, the farther away you get
from that personal level of accountability. Empowerment is
as important a factor as accountability. Empowerment doesn’t
replace it, but being able to empower the team so that they can
tap into the sources of that human identity component is
critical in moving forward and tapping into innovation, find-
ing a solution that people never thought about before. Exces-
sive process also happens to extract the sense of
empowerment away from the team because of lack of control.
In these cases people feel power is in the process, not in the
individual.
The second consequence of excessive process was identi-
fied by Griffin in what he called “an underlying truth about
resources.” The underlying truth is as follows: There is only
so much effort and capability to go around. It’s like funds in
a bank; there is only so much attention you can put on any
design. You have a quantity of people times their available
time, and that is the total effort you, as a manager, can allow
to be expended on a project. Effort must be allocated on those
things which matter and prevented from being utilized on
those things which don’t. Of course, the wisdom lies in
knowing the difference. Good systems engineers are those
who have a highly developed executive function. The ability
to constrain themselves and to constrain their teams from
indulging in expending effort where it is not appropriate, the
ability to husband that bank of resources you have and spend
it on the right things is what makes the difference between
success and failure. You have to choose; success lies in choos-
ing wisely, but not choosing at all is almost a guarantee of
failure. Engineers are not always so good at that yet. Some
people know how to do it and some don’t. No individual and
no team can work all of the possible details that need to be
worked, but that fact is not an excuse to hide behind process.
You can fail for many reasons. You can fail because you broke
a piece of hardware, or your program can fail because you ran
it so far behind schedule and so far over budget that somebody
cancels it for you. We don’t think enough about that mode of
failure. That mode of failure is facilitated by adding layers of
excessive process.
5.4. Role of Process in Failure
Previously five tasks process cannot do were identified by the
panel along with consequences of excessive process. How-
ever, obvious to all system engineers is that, over the last 50
years, methods, processes, and tools have been developed by
the discipline which have advanced the art of design. To be
successful in learning from failure, it is necessary to also
discuss the role of process in failure, in addition to just
identifying what is not its role.
Thomas connected the role of process in failure to his
earlier hypothesis about the identity of systems engineers. He
submitted identity comes from the attitude of oneself, a view-
point of your role in the program and a perspective of how
you fit into the team. I would challenge us to reflect back over
the last 50 years. Has that identity and self-identity, by the
individual or the larger organization, evolved from the system
engineer who is a visionary and technical leader of people,
process, and tools, or a systems engineer who is the steward
of process? Systems engineers to be admired go beyond the
category of craftsmen. Craftsmen are people who understand
process; they are people who understand methods, tech-
niques, and tools. System engineers, however, are much more
than just craftsmen; they have deep technical disciplines, they
have broad abilities to go across multidisciplinary fields, and
they have environmental knowledge that gives perspective
across the domains whether it crosses the missions and tech-
nologies. Systems engineers to be admired have enormous
problem solving skills; they have critical thinking skills,
systems thinking skills, associative thinking skills that show
a curiosity of events and the analysis of causality. The systems
engineers to be admired have extraordinary leadership and
team-building skills, communication, and conflict manage-
ment. It is those skills that will help avoid ultimate failure
more times than not, rather than simply process itself.
Process utilized by a system engineer with proper identity
as described above has a clear role in failure. Process, when
wielded by the previously described systems engineer, pro-
vides efficiencies and the ability to channel the work of
hundreds or thousands. But process by itself is a dangerous
two-edged sword. Process alone is not an answer to failure; it
may be a part of the answer. As leaders there are other options;
process is just one.
6. CLOSING REMARKS
From the beginning the panel emphasized the need to talk
about learning from failure in our larger society so that we can
be successful in the end state, while tolerating the inevitable
failure along the way. It was asked, how do we get back to
that leadership and discipline that our ancestors used to get us
where we are today and not fall back on bureaucracy and
process only to make it work, or in the worst case just to
survive? It was Kadish’s insight into the mischaracterization
of failure that set the stage. He submitted failure means you
don’t accomplish what you set out to as an end item; also said,
failure is an option at every step except the final goal. This
notion of failure was proposed in contrast to the common
perception that failure must be avoided at every step along the
way. The idea that failure is critical in the intermediate steps
leading to the end objective was embraced by the panel.
While failure at intermediate stages is often supported in
rhetoric, in the face of failure the rhetoric evaporates, and the
solution is often more process. It is this levying of more layers
of bureaucracy as a natural reaction—“process is to a bureauc-
racy as heroin is to an addict” as Thomas put it—which serves
only to allow leadership to feel like they did something.
Unfortunately, improper wielding of process in response to
failure also serves to diffuse the value of failure, diffuse the
ability to learn from failure, and diffuse the chance to be
successful through failure. Improper wielding of process in
response to failure masks the opportunities available in fail-
ure. Namely, that failure provides the chance to reassess.
Some of the lessons learned put forth by the panel came
directly from their reflection on involvement in past programs
and comparison of what were identified as “successful pro-
grams” with those that failed. One lesson learned from failure
was identified by both Payton and Griffin as they describe
X-33 and the Hubble Space telescope, respectively. In both
cases, failures of system engineering occurred; however,
while X-33 was terminated for intermediate setbacks, Hubble
continued in spite of setbacks and in the end became an icon.
What accounted for that was persistence, the willingness to
learn from failure and, in the end, do what was necessary to
achieve success.
Near the end of the discussion Payton drew parallels over
several projects. The projects included Intercontinental Bal-
listic Missile programs; Atlas, Titan, Minuteman I, II, and III,
Apollo with its presidentially dictated schedule, and early
Strategic Defense Initiative Organization projects. In all those
projects, the schedule pressures and pace forced individual
accountability because there wasn’t time to have multiple
teams scrutinize every decision or have research council
studies to determine what you were going to go do. A thread
through all those successful programs has been a schedule
driver that forces individual accountability that expedites the
decision making, saves money, and gets the job done. The
panel strongly championed the notion of schedule pressure,
if for no other value than it forces decisions. As Griffin added,
it is better to make a wrong decision and find that out by nature
than to study forever trying to make sure you don’t make a
mistake. The lesson learned put forth by Payton was that
leaders have other options available to them other than more
process. In the specific example laid out, the schedule pro-
moted accountability and forced decision making in contrast
to more process which happens to extract empowerment and
remove accountability.
Emphasized throughout the discussion was the lesson that
good process well followed does not prevent failure. Process
is not the problem, but rather the misuse of process in replace-
ment of thinking and self-accountability. This highlights the
concept of leadership, discipline, accountability, and under-
standing what one is trying to do. Processes are just a part of
that. If there is a path forward, it lies in rethinking what we
mean by the system engineer who does systems engineering
and rethinking how we train the systems engineer. As Thomas
earlier explained, successful systems engineers have many
skills; enormous problem-solving skills, critical thinking
skills, and associative thinking skills, to name a few. Those
skills will result in ultimate success more times than not rather
than simply process itself. Systems engineers need to think of
themselves as being in the design business rather than stew-
ards of process. They need to own and be responsible for
design, not the process. A necessary part of training systems
engineers who can learn from failure and achieve success
through failure is the realization that only through experience
can one develop the scars of decision making, and if one is
not building things it is hard to develop experience. A final
thought was added by Griffin where he emphasized to the
community that in training systems engineers we need to be
training chefs not cooks, Chief Financial Officers not ac-
countants. If we think of it along those lines, success can lie
at the end of the path.
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